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Abstract 
 
Many political scientists have argued, on the basis of extensive quantitative data, that democratic 
governments result in greater spending in health and education and in a redistribution of resources in favour 
of vulnerable groups. Democratic governments are also often associated with a decrease in levels of 
interstate conflict and in internal violence. And yet, there are cases – such as Pakistan – in which this has 
not occurred. Why have these ‘democracy dividends’ not been realized in Pakistan? This paper addresses 
some of the reasons why democratic governance in Pakistan has not translated into social welfare and peace, 
and highlights that the impact of democracy is time and context-specific. Therefore, greater attention must 
be devoted to the historical and societal peculiarities of each country. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we will test the dominant theories on the effects of democratization by 
looking at Pakistan, which since its birth in 1947 has seen the alternation of unelected 
civilian governments which allowed for some measure of political openness (1947-1958), 
elected civilian governments characterized by multiparty politics and fairly free elections 
(1970-’77, 1988-’99, 2008 to present), military governments arising from coup d’etats 
(1958-’69, 69-71, 1977-’88, 1999-2008). However, we have to keep in mind that there 
are no sharp divisions between one period and the other: some military leaders allowed 
for limited periods some level of participatory democracy, including elections (such as 
those for the national and provincial assemblies held on a non-party basis in 1985 under 
Zia ul-Haq, and the general elections held in 2005 under Musharraf), while during some 
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democratic phases unelected institutions such as the military influenced decision-making. 
The most glaring example was that of the 1990s, when Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif 
had to give way to the army in a number of issues; when they attempted to exert greater 
control over the army, they were forced to step down. Benazir Bhutto’s government was 
dismissed twice by the President under military pressure, and Nawaz Sharif was removed 
from his post by a coup in the aftermath of the Kargill war. Elections held in the 1990s 
were characterized according to some analysts by bogus votes, intimidation and 
enticement of voters, and tampering of the results at the polling stations. That the passage 
between democratic and undemocratic phases is much more nuanced that it may appear 
at first sight is shown also by the case of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bhutto, the founder and 
head of the PPP, became president and then prime minister following the 1970 national 
elections, the first to be held in the country. He allowed multipartitism and in 1977 he 
called for general elections. And yet, we cannot consider him an elected leader: first of 
all, it had been the Awami League -AL based in the Eastern wing, not the PPP, that had 
won the elections in 1970. The AL’s leader Mujibur Rahman should have formed the new 
government. The reluctance of the military and civilian elites of the western wing, 
including Bhutto, to recognize the result of the vote precipitated the civil war, which 
resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. Bhutto, whose party had arrived 
second at the general elections, became prime minister in the aftermath of the secession. 
Second, the 1977 elections called by Bhutto were, according to the opposition and many 
analysts, heavily rigged. In sum, the Pakistani case reminds us that there are no clear-cut 
divisions between types of governments. 
In the following pages we will look at the period 1988-1999, one that is usually 
described in western literature as democratic, and assess whether it produced or not any 
welfare dividends. We will then look at the correlation between regime type and conflict 
throughout Pakistani history, with particular attention to internal strife2. First, however, 
we will summarize some of the main findings of the existing literature on the 
consequences of democratization. 
 
                                                 
2 The following analysis draws from E. Giunchi, Democratic Transition and Social Spending: the case of 
Pakistan in the 1990s, in Democratization, Vol. 18, No. 6, 2011, pp. 1270-1290; E. Giunchi, Ethnic Strife 
and Democratization in Pakistan: Some observations on concepts, measurements and the importance of 
history, in Quaderni Asiatici, Vol. XXXI, No. 106, 2014, pp. 21-56. 
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2. The literature on the effects of democratization 
 
In the past decades great attention has been devoted to studying through a quantitative 
cross-country approach the effects of democracy. Most scholars believe, on the basis of 
extensive data collected across a wide number of countries, that higher degrees of 
democracy result in more prosperous, egalitarian and peaceful societies. It is widely held, 
for example, that as levels of democracy increase, economic growth ensues3, though some 
argue that this relationship is more ambiguous4. The bulk of existing studies also argue 
that transitions to democracy entail greater commitment on the part of the State to social 
welfare and to the redistribution of resources. Elected governments, in particular, are 
thought to spend more on health and education and to be more pro-poor than unelected 
ones5. The results are better performances in welfare indicators6 and positive 
distributional effects7. Contrary to this view, which is corroborated by extensive 
quantitative data, other political scientists find no simple correlation between democracy 
and social welfare: by resorting to a quantitative approach they observe that democracies 
                                                 
3 J. Tavares, R. Wacziarg, How Democracy Affects Growth, in European Economic Review, Vol. 45, No. 
8, 2001, pp. 1341-1378. 
4 R.J. Barro, Democracy and Growth, in Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1996, pp. 1-27. 
5 M. Ross, Is Democracy Good for the Poor? in American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 50, No. 4, 
2006, pp. 860-887; D. Stasavage, Democracy and Education Spending in Africa, in American Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2005, pp. 343–58; R. jr. Kaufman, A. Segura-Ubiergo, Globalization, 
Domestic Politics, and Social Spending in Latin America: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis, 1973–
1997, in World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2001, pp. 553–87; D.S. Brown, W. Hunter, Democracy and Social 
Spending in Latin America, 1980–1992, in American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 4, 1999, pp. 
779-90; J.M. Nelson, Elections, Democracy and Social Services, in Studies in Comparative International 
Development, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2007, pp. 79-97; G. Avelino, D. S. Brown, W. Hunter, The Effects of Capital 
Mobility, Trade Openness, and Democracy on Social Spending in Latin America, 1980–1999,  in American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2005, pp. 625-641; D.R. Hecock, Electoral Competition, 
Globalization, and Subnational Education Spending in Mexico, 1999–2004, in American Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2006, pp. 950-961. 
6 B. Moon, W.J. Dixon, Politics, the State and Basic Human Needs: A Cross-National Study, in American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1985, pp. 661–694; T.D. Zweifel, P. Navia, Democracy, 
Dictatorship, and Infant Mortality, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2000, pp. 99-114; P. Navia, 
T.D. Zweifel, Democracy, Dictatorship, and Infant Mortality Revisited, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, 
2003; D.S. Brown, Reading, Writing, and Regime Type: Democracy’s Impact on Primary School 
Enrolment, in Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1999, pp. 681-707; D.A. Lake, M.A. Baum, 
The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services, in Comparative 
Political Studies, Vol. 34, No. 6, 2001, pp. 587-621; M. Baum, D. Lake, The Political Economy of Growth: 
Democracy and Human Capital, in American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2003, pp. 333-
347. 
7 D. Stasavage, Democracy and Education, cit.; D.S. Brown, W. Hunter, Democracy and Social Spending, 
cit.; D.S. Brown, Reading, cit.. 
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do not necessarily spend more on the social sector than authoritarian governments8, and 
that greater government expenditures do not in any case necessarily translate into better 
indicators9, nor do they always benefit the most vulnerable sectors of society10.  
Similar discrepancies are to be found among political scientists studying the effects of 
democratisation on international and internal strife. The bulk of existing studies argues 
that as levels of democracy increase, conflicts between states become more rare11 and 
military expenditures, as a consequence, decrease as a share of both GNP and total 
government spending12. Again, some studies indicate that the relationship between 
democracy and military spending is quite complex13. The idea that democratic systems 
are more likely to promote domestic peace than authoritarian systems is also widely-
held14. Some isolated voices, however, find evidence that democracies are as likely as 
                                                 
8 C.B. Mulligan, R. Gil, X. Sala-i-Martin, Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Non 
Democracies?, in Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2004, pp. 51-74. 
9 J.M. Nelson, Elections, Democracy, cit.; M. Ross, Is Democracy Good, cit.; D. Filmer, L. Pritchett, The 
Impact of Public Spending on Health: Does Money Matter?, in Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 49, No. 
1, 1999, pp. 1309-1323; R. Barlow and B. Vissandjee, Determinants of National Life Expectancy, Canadian 
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 9-29; J.W. McGuire, Basic Health Care Provision and 
Under-Five Mortality: A Cross-National Study of Developing Countries, in World Development, Vol. 34, 
No. 3, 2006, pp. 405-425. 
10 F. Castro-Leal et al., Public Spending on Health Care in Africa: Do the Poor Benefit?, in  Bulletin of the 
World Health Organization, Vol. 78, 2000, pp. 66-74. 
11 P. James, E. Solberg, M. Wolfson, An Identified Systemic Model of the Democracy-Peace Nexus, in 
Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 10, 1999, pp. 1-38; P. James, E. Solberg, M. Wolfson, Democracy 
and Peace: Reply to Oneal and Russett. Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 11, 2000, pp. 215-229; J.R. 
Oneal, B.M. Russett, The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence and Conflict, 1950-
1985, in International Studies Quarterly, Vol.  41, No. 2, 1997, pp. 267-294; J. Yidirim, S. Sezgin, 
Democracy and military expenditure: A cross-country evidence, in Transition Studies Review, 2005, Vol. 
122, No. 1, pp. 93-100. 
12 J.H. Lebovic, Spending Priorities and Democratic Rule in Latin America, in Journal of Peace Research, 
Vol. 45, n. 4, 2001, pp.  427-452; J. Yidirim, S. Sezgin, Democracy and military expenditure, cit.. 
13 I.A. Elbadawi, P. Keefer, Democracy, democratic consolidation and military spending, working paper 
848, ERF, 2014, pp. 1-32. 
14 I.A. Elbadawi, N. Sambanis, How Much War Will We See? Explaining the prevalence of civil war, in 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2002, pp. 307-334; B. Lacina, Explaining the Severity of 
Civil Wars, in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2006, pp. 276-289; R. Nordås, Are Religious 
Conflicts Bloodier? Assessing the impact of religion on civil conflict casualties, Conference paper, ISA 
48th Annual Convention. Chicago IL, February 28-March 3, 2007; N. Sambanis, Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic 
Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A theoretical and empirical inquiry, in Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
Vol. 45, No. 3, 2001, pp. 259-283; T.R. Gurr, Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical conflict and the 
changing world system, in International Security, Vol. 38, 1994, pp. 347-378; D.L. Horowitz, Ethnic 
Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, Berkeley - Los Angeles, 1985; M. Bratton, Do free 
elections foster capable government? The democracy-governance connection in Africa, in Afrobarometer, 
Working Paper No. 104, 2008, pp. 331-354; M. Sørli, N.P. Gleditsch, H. Strand, Why is There So Much 
Conflict in the Middle East?, in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2005, pp. 141-165; N. 
Glazer, Democracy and Deep Divides, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2010, pp. 5-19. 
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authoritarian regimes to be affected by conflict15, if not more16. There is a near consensus, 
however, that hybrid – also called semi-democratic or intermediate – regimes are more 
likely to experience internal conflict17, as do countries going through a transition to 
democracy18. The reasons is that intermediate regimes (and the same can be said about 
transitional regimes) have inherent contradictions stemming from a combination of 
repression, leading to grievances, and openness, facilitating protest. 
Democratic openings can also create expectations that cannot be met and, particularly 
in the early stages of democratization, ethno-nationalist leaders tend to emphasize ethnic 
antagonisms in order to mobilize a support base19. While the greater freedom of the press 
that normally accompanies democratization is exploited by them to disseminate their 
ideas, their exclusivist appeals are not properly scrutinized as freedom of expression is 
not fully developed20. However, transitions to democracy do not always entail violence, 
and stable western democracies have a record of subverting, directly or indirectly, elected 
governments abroad, though fuelling violence abroad is not captured by available data on 
the correlation between democracy and violence. Democratic governments, including 
western ones, may also co-exist with powerful unelected institutions and interest groups 
and with clientelistic networks.  
                                                 
15 G.D. Fearon, D.D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, in American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 97, No. 1, 2003, pp. 84-85. 
16 S.M. Saideman et al., Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A pooled, cross-
sectional time series analysis from 1985-1998, in Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2002, p. 
118; E.N. Muller, E. Weede, Cross-National Variations in Political Violence: A rational action approach, 
in Journal of conflict resolution, Vol. 34, 1990, pp. 624-51.  
17 T. Ellingsen, Toward a Revival of Religion and Religious Clashes?, in Terrorism and Political Violence, 
Vol. 17, No. 3, 2005, pp. 305-332; T. Ellingsen, Colorful community or ethnic witches’ brew? 
Multiethnicity and domestic conflict during and after the cold war, in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 
44, No. 2, 2000, pp. 228-249; H. Hegre et al., Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, political 
change and civil war, 1916-1992, in American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 1, 2001, pp. 33-48; 
G.D. Fearon, D.D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, cit., M. Sørli et al., Why is There So Much 
Conflict, cit.. 
18 T.R. Gurr, Why Minorities Rebel: A global analysis of communal mobilization and conflict since 1945, 
in International Political Science Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1993, pp. 161-201; J. Snyder, From Voting to 
Violence: Democratization and nationalist conflict, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2000; J. Snyder, 
K. Ballentine, Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas, in International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1996, 
pp. 5-40; Y. Sadowski, Ethnic Conflict, in Foreign Policy, No. 111, 1998, pp. 12-23; M.H. Chowdhury, 
Democratization in South Asia. Lessons from American institutions, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003; E.D. 
Mansfield, J. Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why emerging democracies go to war, Mitt Press, Cambridge MA, 
2005. 
19 H. Hegre et al., Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?, cit.. 
20 J. Snyder, K. Ballentine, Nationalism and the marketplace, cit.; J. Snyder, From Voting to Violence, cit.; 
D.L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, cit.. 
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It has also been observed that democratization within fragmented societies may 
politicize and institutionalize internal divisions, thus fuelling violence. For one thing, 
existing divisions offer politicians powerful incentives to play the ethnic and religious 
card to mobilize their own constituency. This does not mean that divisive policies are 
there to stay, however: according to some, they can be overcome by adopting institutional 
changes, such as reforms of the electoral system21. 
The discrepancies that we have mentioned in the studies on the effects of 
democratisation are likely to stem from two factors. First of all, the difficulty in defining 
democracy. The dichotomy between democratic and undemocratic governments is far 
from agreed upon, nor is it clear what constitutes a passage between a ‘level of 
democracy’ and another. Both thick and thin definitions of democracy are wanting on 
many accounts, one of them being that they do not capture the extensive web of internal 
and external factors, of a contingent as well as long-term nature, that interact like living 
organisms, producing complex effects that are difficult to analyze, let alone translate into 
numbers. This leads to the second reason why studies on the effects of democracy do not 
reach an agreement: as we will argue in greater detail at the end of the paper, the impact 
of the political system cannot but be time and space sensitive. It follows that to try and 
understand cause and effect as well as variations between one case and the other, scholars 
should not lose sight of local specificities and should be able to see them in their historical 
unfolding.  
 
3. The 1988-1999 ‘democratic phase’ and welfare 
 
The 1988 elections following Zia ul-Haq’s death raised great expectations in the West: 
they were the first free and contested parliamentary elections after over a decade of 
military rule and as such they were seen by many as heralding a new phase. The belief 
that the ‘democratic wave’22 had reached Pakistan was heightened by the victory of the 
PPP. The party was headed by the daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, whose 
                                                 
21 See B. Reilly (Ed.), Democracy in Divided Societies. Electoral engineering for conflict management, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001; see also M.J. Esman, Ethnic Politics, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca and London, 1994; A. Rabushka, K.A. Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A theory of 
democratic instability, Charles Merrill, Columbus, 1972.  
22 See S.P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century, Vol. IV, University 
of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1993. 
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image as a progressive leader had been propped up by her electoral campaign, which 
focused on social emancipation and human rights. She and Nawaz Sharif, the head of the 
PML, alternated in power as prime ministers between 1988 and Musharraf’s coup d’etat 
in 1999. As elected leaders they were expected to invest more in the social sector than 
their predecessor. However, World Bank and UNDP statistics indicate that this was not 
the case: in the 1990s public expenditure allocated to health and education actually 
decreased as a percentage of GNP when compared to the previous decade of military 
rule23. Overall, as a share of the GNP and of total government spending, allocations to 
these sectors remained below the regional average, with Pakistan fairing worse than 
poorer countries that ranked lower in terms of political freedom and civil liberties like the 
Maldives, Nepal and Bhutan24. As to redistributional policies that are often associated 
with democratic governments, in the 1990s there was an increase in spending on primary 
education, but that increase was in line with what was happening in most of the region 
under the pressure of international aid agencies. 
Statistics also do not take into account ‘ghost schools’, a pervasive phenomenon in 
Pakistan that is the product of a host of factors including lack of infrastructure and roads, 
low salaries of teaching staff, lack of security. The public health sector likewise remained 
marred by absenteeism, lack of meritocracy, limited accountability. The underfunding of 
the public sector and the problems hindering its proper functioning led to a growing 
number of private schools; this has been seen in positive terms by US agencies, as a way 
to circumvent the request for more State25; however, despite charging low fees, private 
schools cannot cater for the worse off sectors of society26. and due to the low salaries of 
their teaching staff they are marred by greater corruption than government schools. NGOs 
and madrasa have increasingly provided support to the poorest sections of society, though 
the quality of education provided by them seems to be wanting on many counts: madrasa 
in particular tend to focus on religious subjects and to adopt a mnemonic approach thus 
fostering an a-critical thinking and hindering the access of students to the job market. 
                                                 
23 See World Bank, World Development Indicators 2008, in http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/indicators/en (last 
accessed 13.04.2011). 
24 S. Gupta, M. Verhoeven, E.R. Tiongson, Does Higher Government Spending Buy Better Results in 
Education and Health Care?, Working Paper 99/21, IMF, Washington D.C., 1999, pp. 10-13. 
25 N. Naviwala, Pakistan’s Education Crisis: The real story, Washington D.C., Wilson Center, 2016. 
26 M. Akhram, J.K. Faheem, Health Care Services and Government Spending in Pakistan, Pakistan Institute 
of Development Economics, Islamabad, 2007. 
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On a positive note, at the end of the 1990s health indicators showed marked 
improvements compared to the beginning of the decade, though this output was part of a 
global trend, led by the UN, that took place also elsewhere irrespective of regime type. 
Improvements in Pakistan were actually less dramatic than elsewhere in the region; as a 
consequence, at the end of the 1990s Pakistani infant and child mortality rates were higher 
than in the rest of the region, including countries that had similar or lower pro capita 
income and that fared worse in terms of political and civil liberties27. Pakistan compared 
unfavourably with the rest of the region also in terms of educational achievements28. 
In sum, there were some positive achievements, though their correlation with the 
political system is doubtful. In any case improvements were very limited, a product of the 
limited commitment of both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to welfare. How to explain 
the limited investment in the social sector by their elected governments? Contingent 
problems certainly played a part: millions of Afghan refugees had flowed into the country 
as a consequence of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and of the subsequent civil war. These 
refugees, besides causing ethnic and religious tensions in northern Beluchistan, were a 
burden to the State’s resource, especially as foreign aid to Pakistan after 1990 started to 
decrease. The government was forced to borrow from commercial banks at higher interest 
rates, causing foreign debt and debt servicing to raise as a percentage of the annual 
budget29. Pakistan’s reliance on the IMF, which had deepened since the 1988 Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAP), did not have any positive consequences on economic 
variables. It will be under general Musharraf’s regime in 1999-2008 that major economic 
variables will show an improvement, partly a product of  the economic boom at the global 
level30. IMF conditional lending, besides failing to contribute to economic growth, 
prompted Pakistani governments in the 1990s to cut public expenditures, thus squeezing 
social spending31. The strings attached to the structural adjustment package of 1988-91 
also led to increases in taxes and to the reduction of the support price for essential crops. 
                                                 
27 UNDP, Human Development Report 2001, hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2001/chapters/ (last 
accessed 03.05.2018).  
28 World Bank, Pakistan Poverty Assessment, passim. 
29 O.B. Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the storm, New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 231. 
30 J. Nasir, IMF Programs in Pakistan (1988-2008): An Analysis, in CQ Criterion Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 
4, 2012, http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/imf-programs-in-pakistan-1988-2008-%E2%80%93-an-
analysis/ (last accessed 23.01. 2019) 
31 N. Gera, Impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes on Overall Social Welfare in Pakistan, in South 
Asia Economic Journal, Vol. 8, 2007, pp. 39-64. 
 n. 1/ 2019   Pagina | 9  
Nuovi Autoritarismi e Democrazie: Diritto, Istituzioni, Società (NAD) 
IMF standby loan of 1993 and subsequent packages until 1999 were consistent with 
earlier packages as far as conditionality is concerned. Cuts in subsidies and wage restraint 
were accompanied by the freezing of employment in the public sector32, at a time when 
power prices were increasing. By 1998, a decade after the launch of SAP, domestic 
savings and investments had increased, but at a great cost: GDP growth had decreased 
and unemployment had increased, together with poverty incidence, depth and severity.33 
The following table shows the cuts to subsidies and to resources devoted to health and 
education as a share of GDP since 1989-9034. 
 
Public Spending cuts on subsidies, education, and health 
Year Subsidies (%FDP) Health (%GNP) Education 
(%GNP) 
1987-88             1.50                                1.0                                2.4 
1988-89             1.66                                1.0                                2.4 
1989-90             1.47                                1.0                                2.2 
1990-91             1.10                                0.9                                2.1 
1991-92             0.94 0.7 2.2 
1992-93 0.73 0.7 2.2 
1993-94 0.58 0.7 2.2 
1994-95 0.35 0.6 2.4 
1995-96             0.64 0.8 2.4 
1996-97             0.54 0.8 2.6 
1997-98 0.48 0.7 2.3 
Source: J. Nasir, cit., on the basis of various Economic Surveys of Pakistan  
The 1990 Gulf War also had negative effects on Pakistani economy, as it reduced 
particularly between 1991 and 1993 the remittances flowing into Pakistan, which had 
                                                 
32 T. Anwar, Structural Adjustment and Poverty-The case of Pakistan, in The Pakistan Development 
Review, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1996, pp. 911-926. 
33 A.R Kemal, Structural adjustment, macroeconomic policies, and Poverty trends in Pakistan, Asia and 
Pacific Forum on Poverty, ADB, 2001. 
34 J. Nasir, IMF Programs in Pakistan (1988-2008), cit.. 
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previously counted for a considerable share of national income35. Foreign remittances to 
Pakistan according to official data declined from US$ 1467 million in 1991 toUS$1086 
million in 2000/036.  
To make things worse, in 1990, sanctions were imposed on Pakistan under Pressler 
Amendment. The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the effects of the weakening of Iran after the first Gulf war removed the 
major concerns of US foreign policy in the region and decreased Pakistan’s importance 
to US eyes. The issue of Nuclear Non-Proliferation thus became of priority concern for 
US foreign policy makers, who were increasingly concerned that Pakistan-Indian 
relations might degenerate in a nuclear war37. Thus, the $564 million of economic and 
military assistance approved for the fiscal year 1991 was frozen, though certain items 
such as humanitarian aid and bank loans and credits for purchase of food and agricultural 
commodities were exempted. Particularly after 1996 US-Pakistan relations did undergo 
some improvement, but the funds flowing to Islamabad never assumed the proportions 
they had had in the previous decade, when Pakistan had been a key ally in the proxy war 
in Afghanistan.   
There were also more structural, long-term factors at play: firstly, the political role of 
the military. The armed forces, which had been since Partition a powerful player and had 
undergone since the 1950s, when the country became a bastion of US policy in the region, 
a process of modernization, had been further empowered under Zia in the context of the 
‘free world’s support to the mujaheddin. Islamabad had become key in the CIA’s 
distribution of weapons to the Afghan seven Peshawar-based parties, and the distribution 
was managed by the Pakistani armed forces and secret services. In the 1990s the army, 
while not directly in power, controlled behind the scenes certain sectors of decision–
making and prevented the elected leaders from significantly reducing the military budget; 
as a consequence, defense spending between 1988 and 2000 as a percentage of the GDP 
                                                 
35 M.S. Butt, J.S. Bandara, Trade Liberalization and Regional Disparity in Pakistan, Routledge, Abingdon, 
2009, p. 52; U. Cock, Y. Sun, Remittances in Pakistan. Why have they gone up, and why aren’t they coming 
down?, IMF working paper, 2011, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11200.pdf  (last accessed 
03.05. 2018). 
36 M. Irfan, Remittances and Poverty Linkages in Pakistan: Evidence and Some Suggestions for Further Analysis, 
PIDE working paper, 2011, p. 3 
37 T. Mahmood, Pressler Amendment and Pakistan’s Security Concerns, in Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 47, No. 4, 
October 1994; M.F. Anwar, US Sanctions Against Pakistan: Rationale and Impact (1990-2001), in Pakistaniaat: 
A Journal of Pakistan Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2013.  
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did slightly decrease, but it remained above the region’s average38. One should not assume 
however that the civilian elites, in the 1990s as well as at other times in the country’s 
history, were strongly in favour of diverting resources from the military to the social 
sector: the Indian ‘threat’, Afghan supposed meddling with Pakistani internal affairs and 
the permanent state of instability north of the Durand Line were widely thought by 
Pakistani elites, whether civilian or not, as necessitating great investments in the armed 
forces. 
Other factors explaining the limited commitment of Pakistani elected governments in 
the 1990s to social spending are low literacy levels and the prevalence of family/biraderi, 
ethnic affiliations and clientelistic networks, which had the effect of hindering the 
awareness of socio-economic inequalities and structural problems among the population. 
Besides limiting the pressure that was exerted over politicians to adopt welfare policies, 
these factors limited the horizon of elected politicians: the latter had no incentive to 
address systemic issues that would require long-term measures and to cater to the interests 
of those living outside of their immediate constituency. To this we should add that feudal 
elites who were contrary to greater spending on welfare and distributional policies were 
entrenched in the National Assembly, in the government and in the main parties. Under 
Benazir Bhutto, who belonged to a family of Sindhi landowners, rural elites were 
overrepresented in the National assembly to the detriment of middle classes and lower 
income groups39. The PPP itself represented to a great extent the interests of the Sindhi 
landed elite. As to the Punjabi business elites who supported Nawaz Sharif, they were 
linked by family ties to the higher military echelons and to Punjabi landlords; another 
major constituency of Sharif was conservative religious groups, who had no interest in 
redistributive politics that may erode their material interests and psychological hold over 
poor communities. Saudi support of the PML-N further watered down any redistributive 
temptation that may have been felt within by the party. Besides their elitist bias, both 
parties were dominated by personalities and established dynasties, and continued to 
discriminate against certain ethnic and religious groups. 
 
                                                 
38 WB, World Bank Indicators 2009, data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/indicators/en (last accessed 
03.05.2018). 
39 S. Shafqat, Democracy and Political Transformation in Pakistan, in S. Mumtaz, J.L Racine, I. Ali (Eds.), 
Pakistan: The contours of state and society, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 225. 
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4. Democracy and peace 
 
We have already mentioned that quantitative research on the effects of democracy 
present some inconsistency in the definition of what constitutes democracy, and in criteria 
and periods used for datasets. The analysis of the correlation between democracy and 
ethnic strife is hampered by additional conceptual problems, mostly related to the 
employment of loose definitions which tend to confuse religion with ethnicity. While I 
have dealt with these issues elsewhere40, I wish to stress here that even if we take at face 
value existing datasets, no correlation seems to exist in Pakistani history between 
democracy and peace. Again, the Pakistani case contradicts the findings of many political 
scientists working on democratization. The datasets commonly used by them, such as 
those by PITF (Political instability task force, funded by the CIA)41,by UCDP/PRIO 
(Upsala conflict data programme/Peace research Institute Oslo)42, and the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (BTI) all show that domestic strife in Pakistan did not decrease 
during democratic phases. If anything, strife became more intense in terms of number of 
casualties. As we have already mentioned, the traumatic 1971 civil war that torn the 
country apart , resulting in the secession of the eastern wing, occurred after the first 
national elections had taken place. The reason is quite obvious: the elections raised the 
expectation among Bengalis, who despite being the majority were marginalized and 
discriminated against, that they would obtain the majority of seats in the National 
Assembly and form a government. However, the reluctance by the military and civilian 
leaders of the western wing to allow the AL to form a government and the badly disguised 
racism of the Punjabi-dominated military precipitated the crisis. While the brutal 
repression of Bengali protestors took place under the military government of Yahya 
Khan, civilian politicians of the western wing did not oppose it. India’s military 
intervention in the civil war may have contributed to the civilian leaders’ support of the 
military. In the aftermath of the secession of the eastern wing, strife broke out also in 
Beluchistan, again as a consequence of ethnic discrimination. External support (this time 
                                                 
40 E. Giunchi, Ethnic Strife and Democratization, cit.. 
41 See J. Goldstone et al., A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability, in  American Journal of 
Political Science , Vol. 54 , No. 1, 2000, pp. 190-208.  
42 The dataset is described in N.P. Gleditsch et al., Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset, in Journal 
of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 5, 2002, pp. 615-637. 
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from Afghanistan) helped the insurgents but fuelled the Pakistani elites’ sense of 
vulnerability, prompting them to repress brutally, with Iranian support, the insurrection. 
Beluchi rebellion would resurface under the military regime of general Musharraf, in 
power since 1999, a consequence of persisting discrimination against the province and of 
the increasing influx of Punjabi workers and military personnel in the area of Gwadar 
which was being renovated with Chinese support. Also protests and violence by Sindhis, 
Mohajir and Pashtuns have taken place in Pakistani history irrespective of regime type. 
Sindhis and Mohajirs mobilized mostly, but not only, under the military regime of Zia as 
a consequence of ongoing discrimination fuelled by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s demise, of 
migration dynamics which increased the weight of Pashtuns in Karachi and ensuing 
competition for scarce resources. Anti-state attacks by neo-traditionalist groups in the 
Pashtun belt and attacks against religious minorities became a severe problem in the 
1990s and continued under elected and unelected leaders, a consequence of the 
militarization of Pashtun areas in the 1980s and the increasing convergence between pro-
Wahhabi groups, jihadists and criminal networks linked to narcotrafficking.  
As to inter-state violence, the first India-Pakistan war (1947-1949) took place under a 
civilian unelected government; the following ones (1965 and 1971) under military 
governments, though in 1971 it was democratic India which decided to intervene 
militarily in the Pakistani civil war; the 1999 Kargil war took place under Nawaz Sharif, 
and since then skirmishes along the LoC have often occurred irrespective of regime type. 
In sum, international conflict was more pronounced when Pakistan had a military 
government, but took place also during ‘democratic’ phases. As to internal strife, no 
correlation can be observed between violence and a particular regime type. If anything, 
the worst levels of internal violence erupted in the 1970s, after Pakistan’s first national 
elections, while religious violence became widespread in the 1990s. This may support the 
thesis that governments undergoing transitions to democracy, like hybrid governments, 
are particularly prone to domestic violence. What is certain in any case is that variables 
other than the political system explain domestic strife: among them, ethnic grieviances, 
interferences by foreign countries, and islamization policies that fuel an exclusivist and 
intolerant vision of Islam.  
 
5. Conclusions 
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After a decade of Musharraf’s military rule, democracy returned to Pakistan. National 
elections were held in 2008, resulting in a PPP-PML-N coalition government, and in 
2013, with the PML-N winning the majority of votes. In 2018 Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf - 
PTI swept the polls and its leader Imran Khan became head of State. In each of these 
occasions, the elected civilian government was able to complete a full term in office and 
peacefully transfer power to another elected government. This has been considered by 
many observers as a step forward towards a fully democratic State, which as such, so the 
argument goes, will produce welfare and peace dividends. Things, however, as we have 
seen, are much more complicated. There is no guarantee that Pakistan will not be touched 
by a ‘counter-wave’, nor that greater democracy will have a positive impact on welfare 
and internal stability and security. We have seen that no clear-cut correlation between 
democracy and welfare, and between democracy and peace, existed in the previous 
decades of Pakistani history. It can be held that democratic transitions have lasted too 
little to take roots and produce durable and significant effects: as it has been noted by 
some political scientists, the stock of democracy is an important factor to be taken into 
consideration43. This points to the shallowness of procedural definitions of democracy: 
what makes the difference, as many others have also pointed out, is substantial 
democracy. However, we are left wondering what is the ideal duration of the ‘stock’ for 
it to produce positive results, and what a ‘mature’ democracy would consists of. In any 
case, it may not only the limited duration of democracy that gives Pakistan’s political 
system a hybrid character: although undoubtedly many young democracies have adopted 
the form of electoral democracy while remaining illiberal, it could be argued that most 
regimes are, in Diamond’s words, ‘ambiguous’44. 
While there is no doubt that in the last decade procedural democracy has become more 
entrenched in Pakistan, it must be pointed out that also the latest elections were marred 
by some fraud and rigging, with the military accused of tilting the electoral playing field 
in the PTI’s favour. Although there is no evidence that this actually happened, there is no 
                                                 
43 G. Carbone, V. Memoli, Does Democratization Foster State Consolidation? Democratic rule, political 
order, and administrative capacity, in Governance, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2015; S.M. Saideman et al., 
Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A pooled, cross-sectional time series analysis 
from 1985-1998, in Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2002, p. 115. 
44 L.J. Diamond, Thinking about Hybrid Regimes, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2002, pp. 21-
35.  
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doubt that the actual government, like the previous ones, defers to the military on certain 
issues. As to ethnic institutional asymmetry, which has been a constant source of tensions 
and strife in Pakistani history, voting still takes place on the basis of ethnic affiliations: 
the PTI is the largest party in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the PPP in Sindh, the newly-formed 
Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) in Balochistan, and the PML-N in Punjab. The ruling 
PTI, like the PPP and the PML-N, is dominated by personalities and displays an elitist 
bias. And, like previous governments, it has been unable to significantly decrease internal 
violence: attacks associated with Taliban, separatists and sectarian militants continue to 
cause a high number of casualties. Nor have Pakistan’s relationships with its neighbours 
improved. While it is partly to the credit of Imran Khan that the recent crisis with Pakistan 
over Kashmir has not degenerated into a full-fledged war, Indo-Pakistan relations remain 
sour and both the Kashmir and Durand Line disputes remain unresolved. As to the future 
of Pakistani democracy, links with Saudi Arabia and China may contribute to consolidate 
the undemocratic features of the Pakistan political system. Western support itself has 
often benefitted military governments: The US and their allies supported Zia’s military 
regime during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; they did so again after 9/11, when 
Pakistan, then under the military government of Musharraf, became a key element in the 
‘war against terror’. Given the geostrategic centrality of AfPak, and the web of interests 
by state and non state actors centered around it, we cannot rule out that an external power 
may support a military regime if that may further its interests. 
The above observations make it quite obvious, I believe, that studying the effects of a 
particular regime type should entail (also) a contextual and historical perspective. The 
Pakistani case study indicates that democracy by itself, particularly in its procedural 
definition, is not per se the solution. Presumably, for a democracy to result in 
redistributive policies certain preconditions must exist; among them, the existence of an 
informed and politically aware society, the weakening of clientelistic affiliations, the 
capacity of elected governments to free themselves from military oversight as well as 
from outside pressure to cut welfare. As for the correlation between democracy and 
internal strife, the regional and international context must be taken into consideration, as 
well as the existence of grievances by groups who are marginalized and discriminated 
against, the de facto norms regulating access to political power and to scarce resources 
and the image of ethnic and religious minorities in state rhetoric and textbooks. Many of 
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these factors cannot be easily assessed, let alone measured. And yet, I believe that 
devoting attention to time and space, and trying to capture the multiplicity of non 
measurable explanatory variables that influence decision-making, no matter how untidy 
and messy it may be, would greatly contribute to our understanding of reality. As 
Diamond observed, classificatory schemes «impose an uneasy order on an untidy 
empirical world»45. What I am arguing is not that we should shelve classifications, nor 
that we should do away with statistics and cross-comparisons; rather, we should attempt 
to make more room for that ‘untidy empirical world’: as Hirshman observed almost half 
a century ago, what is needed is «a little more ‘reference for life’ [...] and a little less 
wishful thinking»46. 
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